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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No.

LEmlARDO RAYES,

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMEN"r OF THE

OF THE CASE

The Appellant, Leonardo Rayes, appeals from the conviction
judgment of Aggravated Robbery, a felony in the first degree,
in the Third Judicial District,
cf

in and for Salt Lake Countv, State

Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding.
DISPOSITION

THE L01.JER COURT

0n March 10, 1983, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson nresided
the jurv trial where the Appellant was found guilty of the offense
Aggravated Robberv, a felonv in the first degree.

He was sub-

- Hcntl;1 sentenced to the indeterminate term of five years to life

e

State Prison to run consecutivelv with the sentence he

cu,rentlv serving.

Apnellant was not fined for this offense.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction and a rer;ir 1 1
the Third Judicial District Court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Mr. Leonardo Rayes, the Appellant, and Mr. Ibian Ortiz, t:
co-defendant, were brought to trial as co-defendants on Januar:1 2;

1983.

On that same day, Judge Wilkinson granted a continuance fc:

this trial because defense counsel were given, only after theic
request, approximately 15 pages of su,pplemental police reports M'.
previously submitted to them after proper formal discovery request
A second trial date was set for February 7, 1983, and a continuanc:
was granted until February 14, 1983.
During the second trial, which began on February 14, 198'
and was held before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, the
declared a mistrial as to the Appellant when the iury saw him
shackled, and in prison clothes.

At that point, a severance was

granted between the two co-defendants.
and he was convicted as charged.

Mr. Ortiz's trial proceece

Mr. Rayes' third trial date was

set for March 9, 1983, and orovides the basis for this appeal.
Richard Bullock, the prosecution's first witness testifie:
that on Septebmer 20, 1982, a robbery occurred at the Oualitv n;_;
Gas Station located at 3910 South 900 East.
viduals involved in the robbery.

There were two indi·

Richard Bul J od: w,qs the cashie·

and only employee on duty at the time of the rohberv, which
approximately 9:00 p.m. that night (T.17).

-2-

'.v3S

One of the robbers had a gun and commanded Mr. Bullock
lie down on the floor while the cash register was emptied
; Ji

ilr. 8ullock originally reported the amount of money

, iken '.vas under $1 70. 00, but later admitted he was mis taken

.ibout the amount.

Mr. Bullock described the clothes the two men

.1ere wearing (T .18), and noted that both individuals snoke with
an accent and probably were not speaking Enslish, but he could
net nositively identify the language they were using (T. 20).
In his initial account to the nolice, Mr. Bullock failed
to report this accent to the police (T .31).

He also originally

both men as black, but then stated that they had black
features but were lighter in skin coloring; and then he later
stated that one of them could have been Mexican (T. 24).

Prior to

the mistrial granted before Judge Fredrick, he testified under
Jath that the one he believed was Mexican was the co-defendant, Mr.
lbian Ortiz.

On his subsequent testimony, Mr. Bullock's descrip-

tion of Mr. Rayes gradually changed to fit Appellant's apnearance.
'.!r. Bullock admitted his original description to the nolice may

ha'.•e been mistaken (T. 30).
During the third trial setting the court sustained the
'"tate's objections concerning cross-examination of Mr. Bullock, who
"

73

s the onlv eyewitness.

Defense counsel attempted to question Mr.

Sullock about reports of mistaken eyewitness identification (T. 34-5),
never allowed to fully explore the strength of Mr. Bullock's

a puint which the Appellant now appeals.
During this same "third" trial, defense counsel requested
mid-trial continuance, as a defense witness, Ozzie Ahmed,
'.nne unn. •t iced, due to the State's delay in turning over the

-3-

police reports, until the day before the trial when the infoc,
was disclosed in a report.

Defense counsel's investi»ator

to find Mr. Ahmed throughout the day, but was unsuccess''ll
this witness the defense was unable to present critical infoF.a•
to the jury.
At about 8: 50 p. m. , the evening of the robber" in quest::·
a suspicious vehicle was reported bv Mr. Ahmed in the vicinit·• ;'
the Triangle Service Station at 4200 South Highland Drive--a]o•J'
1 1/2 miles away from the scene of the robbery (T. 64,
Ahmed, supposedly, had not only S'?'en the vehicle but had also
the number of occupants in the vehicle.

Defense counsel was uni'.

to establish this evidence during the trial through anv other
witnesses (T.81).
The police investigated the suspicious vehicle and estat::
the fact that it was registered to a Ms. Peterson (T.81, 89).
around 10:00 or 10:30 p.m. that evening, Salt Lake Citv Police
Officer

Robert Robinson stopped a car fitting the "suspicious

vehicle" description reported earlier.

Three Hisnanic f'.lales ·:e·'

in the car: Pedro Diaz, Santiago Crespo, and Ibian Ortiz.
was not in this car

Anoe ..

which was nrobablv the reoorted vehic:.
ARGU11EN'r
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOITI'Jl, J:'ULL C:l\OSSEXAMINATION OF THE STATE'S CHIEF \HT'1ESS
REGARDING EYEWITNESS IDE'.ITI'°TCA'rION
In the case at bar, evewitness identification nro i'e
crucial link in the State's case

The Defendant ',\noel lant

-4

!

3
1

erious questions about the possibility of misidentification,

1 lurlin" :Tr

Bullock's admission that his original descriotions to

no lice ma:• have been mistaken (T. 30).

The Sixth Amendment of

. e ·•nc ted State;, Constitution requires the accused "to be per-

to introduce all relevant and admissible evidence."

The test

ul r!1 e relevancy of such testimony is "whether the proffered eviJenee would render the desired inference more probable then [sic]

!:le without such evidence."
i263 IUt

State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1/.60,

1980).

Courts have long
Dee

it

that identification testimony

ents svecial problems of reliability hecause the in-court testi-

Jon:· of an eyewitness can be devastatingly oersuasive.
515 F. 2d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 1975).

U.S. v.

It is essential the

'Jefendant be allowed to fully develoo the conditions under which
identification was made and probe whether the identification
cern.<iins unqualified and certain after full cross-examination.

Here,

.·nere mis-identification is the defense, the Defendant should have
)een afforded an opportunity to elicit answers ooich would imoeach
veracitv, the capacity to observe, and imoartiality, and the
of the witness.
'. 9 • '

l

McCormick, Evidence (2d Cleary Ed.

Section 2 2 at 4 9 .
On cross-examination of Mr. Bullock, the eyewitness defense
stated
ll:n•e vou had an opportunity, Mr. Bullock, to read
,.•
articles or wath anv television programs
'1n.
an identification, eyewitness identifi11_ LlJn
(

.\

1)bjection, Your Honor.

-5-

Irrelevant.

Q.

I think it goes to credihilitv, Your Honor

Q.
Have voubecome aware of situations, l'r llll][,
in which persons who have
r1ade e"e·.,·itnc:o·
identifications have in fact been •vrong about
identifications?

CA.

J.

It is irrelevant

Objection, Your Honor.
I am going to sustain it.

(T.34-35).
In People v. Clark, 47 Cal.Rptr.

407 P.2d 20l

'"

the defendant's conviction for col'1I'litting lewd acts on the 'i0:
a child under fourteen was based on "the testimonv o:C ':he a'.'.c,,:
victim herself.

The defendant sought to establish that 'lee •e,:

many concerning sexual intercourse with t'ie defendant •. ·as
cated, but was not allowed to question her about

thdt

might have undermined her credibilitv.
The California Supreme Court noted the trial court
perly limited the scope of cross examination and the recenrion
other evidence that went to the alleged victim's credi:iili:·:
reversing the conviction.

The court exDlained·

[D]efendant put in issue the orosecutrix'
motives, the possibilitv of fabrication, and
the role fantasv mav have nlaved
Hence,
evidence rebutting her statement
relevant to the issues involved.
The iMnroprietv, therefore, of
such e"idence
.·on
of the prosecutrix
. is clear.
Id. at 296.
Authorities agree the broade"c
examination aimed at impeach int•

cl

'-11

rne';

l TI

(Chadbourn Revision) Sect ion 90>', and '-'cC<>r-; c :·
Ed.

1972) Section 30

1•

prosecuting witness further deprives him of
. , 1

·,,

en·'"'ent right to confront his accusers.

t 11e

In

case of State v.

Zolantakis,

70 Utah 296, 259 P.1044,

•his Cnurt reversed a conviction for violation of oro. i' i •ion laws.

,,e,e:."

This Court exoressed its concern for the need to

eight of cross-examination by stating, "In a judicial

ecricalion the ri2ht of a cross-examination is an absolute right
-iece privilege of the party against whom the witness is
. [C]ross-examination of a witness may not only modify
J:·

e:·.:cc1in

but it ma:r destroy the evidence in chief."

Failure to

:Jll crnss-examination prejudiced Mr. Raves just as it had
the defendant in State v. Zolantakis.
Court again addressed the question of inhibited cross·:·,:.inatic•n in '..Jeber Basin Water Conservancv District v. Ward, 10
34 · P. 2d 862. 864-65 (1959).

In holding there had been

cestriction of cross-examination of the condemnee, this
·seated. "[T]he purpose of cross-examination is to give

e"<ar:: co•.msel the ooportunity not only to inquire into uncer'11ties relating to the testimonv in chief, but to test its
'fuate:rer mav tend to explain, modify, or contradict
c'.c..:·ect e\·idence should be allowed."
de'initive statement from the United States Suoreme
i.-:i•ation of cross-exarlination and the Sixth Amend-

-·en

'"" ::1 c.·1ith •·
··c:e··

·:n;

Illinois,
l\,• .-·11

390 U.S. 129 (1963).

The defendant

s2 les ,,f na1·cotics and was not allowed to

\. ., ;1: ic.:.ec11tion :-c·:- ':he chief r.\ritness' name or address.
"

'

'

1
•

ire its Jutv to orotect the witness from nossible

The

retaliation for testifying did not outweigh the defend;:int 's r1 2 •
to cross-examination.

The Supreme Court stated, "[P]reju<lice

ensues from a denial of the opportunity to place the witnPss

1

proper setting and put the weight of his testimonv and his ere'
lity to a test, without which the jury cannot <:airly apnraise ,,,
Id. at 132, quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 638-''
(1931).

The Court also noted the irnnortant role of cross-exal'lir.-

ation in exposing falsehood and in bringing out truth.

Smith

Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968), at 131.
In the present case, Appellant'£ defense was seriousb
damaged by his inability to challenge

the credibility of the or.c

witness and show bias on the part of a witness testifying a;caino:
him upon whose testimony his conviction rested.

Had he been

extended the necessary latitude in cross-examination as riandates
Weber Basin Water Conservancy v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29, 34 7 P. 2d
364-65 (1959), and Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968), che
could have had a reasonable doubt about his identification.
The trial court's improper limitation of cross-examinati
in the present case prejudiced Appellant.

As a result, his

Amendment right to confront his accuser was effectively denied
His conviction under these circumstances cannot be upheld.
POINT II
THE FAILURE TO CONTINUE THE '?RIAL TO ALLO\•J
APPELLAin TO SECURE THE PRESE'7CE OF 1\ CRUCIAL
WITNESS DENIED HIM HIS SIXTH A.c'1ENDME'1T RIGHT
TO COMPULSORY PROCESS.
During the first day of trial, Appellant's attorne"
a brief continuance so an essential witness, who had iust he?n
covered, could be brought in to testify.

Invest1gaturs

. "· ''r

had tried, unsuccessfully, to find the wi rness, 'lzc:ie 1\li:·,,.,' '

-S-

2

trial court was aware Appellant would not have been prejudiced
a continuance because he was already serving time at the Utah
P1ison (T.77).

Ozzie Ahmed, the desired witness, saw and

'epurted a suspicious vehicle around 8: 50 p. m. on the evening in
c;uestion, only minutes before the robbery at Quality Oil.
!hmed reported this suspicious vehicle to Mr.

Mr.

Rencher who was work-

ing at the Triangle Service Station at 4200 South Highland Drive
IT

-2J

As a result of his observation, the police investigated

and, at about 10: 00 or 10: 30 p. m. , stopped the reported vehicle
Three Hispanic men were in the vehicle, one of them

rT.33-9).

)eing the co-defendant, Mr. Ibian Ortiz; but Mr. Rayes, the
;opellant, was not in the car.

Ozzie Ahmed's testimony was crucial

because he would have testified Mr. Rayes was not in the car at
8 50 p. m. , which was just prior to the robbery.

Although there are no Utah cases directly on point, in State
419 P.2d 789 0Jash. 1966), the court held that denial of
a continuance requested by the defendant constituted reversible
e'·ror.

In State v Watson, an eyewitness, who could support the defen-

8ant 's theory of self-defense to a killin12;, was located and agreed
'.o

testify.

The witness failed to appear at the trial, however,

defense counsel's motion for a continuance in that case was
e;:nneously denied.

As in State v lfatson,

defense counsel here made

efforts to locate Mr. Ahmed through investigators.

If

· '" ·iefense' s motion for a continuance had been granted, Mr. Ahmed,
.: '· l like 1 ihood, would have been found.
In Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1976), the Sunreme

·=' of Alaska reversed and remanded a first degree murder conviction
-9-

because the trial court denied a one-dav continuancP tn sec_
testimony of an absent police officer.

Alaska follows

rule that the trial court's decision to denv a continu1n1·r
remain intact on aopeal absent a showing of abuse of disccpr:·
Id. at 71.

The court went on to state an arbitrarv refusdl

due process and thar the issue can be resolved hv examining t'.e
reasons for the requested continuance.
the reasons for the request,

Id. at 72.

In

·

the court articulated a test tc ,.

deciding whether a mid-trial continuance should be granted

:.2,

seven factors which constitute the test are:

1.

Whether the testimony is material to the case:

2.

Whether the testimony can be elicited from anothec
source;

3.

Whether the testimony is cumulative,

4.

Probability of securing the absent witness in a
reasonable time;

5.

Whether the requesting partv was diligent and act:":
in good faith;

6.

The inconvenience to the court and/or others. anc

7.

The likelihood that the testfrionv would ha·:e
the jury's verdict.

Although Salazar v. State, is not a Utah case, at
least two of the seven factors have been adopted bv this
State v. Hartman, 101 Utah 29.'3, 119 P :>d 112 11941)
Freshwater, 30 Utah

442, 85 P

to the case at bar it is clear that Ahmed's tec;tic-.nn

"i"

it could not be elicited fror-1 :m·1bod" el:.c
the witness could,

in all likelir1(>ood

be

01r"''

in

1

'·"l1''

0

C')

•"

nc;el had acted diligently and in good faith; Anpellant
'i-i':e been prejudiced by the delay, and inconvenience to

_"ff:

the State would have been minil'lal; and finally, the

-·'-on: ,_.;oulJ probably have affected the jury's verdict.

Washint?on v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), sunports Aooel;'HJSition.

In

v. Texas, the court reversed a

-c•Jn·:iction because the defendant was denied his Sixth Amend-

1e1-

-:'."'.· :io'it co compulsory process when he was not allowed to call a
- 0

:e:-ial ·_.;i tness vital to his defense.

The court stated:

The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and
:o compel their attendance, if necessary, is in
plain terms the right to present a defense, the
right to present the defendant's version of the
as 0ell as the prosecution's to the jury so
it mav decide where the truth lies.
Just as an
accused has the right to confront the prosecution's
witnesses for the puroose of challenging their
testimony, he has the-right to present his own
·.;i tnesses to establish a defense.
This right is a
fundamental element of due process of law.
19

ct

case at bar, Appellant, in all likelihood, could have produced
\r.:r.ec to testify to the events he personally observed if the
:::3' court had granted a brief continuance.

By not allowing Mr.

·es to produce this witness, however, the court effectively denied
'-is

Amendment right to compulsory witnesses, and his con-

:ion should_ therefore, be reversed.
CONCLL'SION

f'ie t-iJl court erred in not allowing full cross-examination
;, ,." ' ' :::ain witness regarding knowledge of eyewitness identi,r,

F,ii luce to allow Appellant to elicit answers

-11-

from this

witness, which could impeach his veracitv, credibilitv, caoacit·.·
observe,and impartialitv, denied Anpellant his Sixth Anenclr:ie 11
right to confrontation.

Failure of the trial court to >'rant

continuance to allow Appellant to secure a material witness
could have testified on his behalf,

further denied Aonellant s

Amendment right to compulsory process.

In the interest of just'::

any conviction based on either of these violations of Appellant':
Sixth Amendment rights should be dismissed.
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